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« Slander | Main | What A Letdown »

A Shuttle By Any Other Name

NASA may, thankfully, be about to make major changes in its vaunted "Space Launch Initiative," known in acronym shorthand as SLI.

A major review of the program scheduled for November has been rescheduled, with no definite new date. Its future is in flux, as policy in space transportation (particularly reusable space transportation) is clearly being rethought.

There are a number of factors that drive this. The current plan is based on the (in my opinion, flawed) doctrine from the Clinton Administration that NASA would be responsible for reusable vehicles, and the Air Force would take the lead for expendable ones. But with the shakeup in the military space program being instigated by Don Rumsfeld, the assumptions behind this philosophy, to the degree that they were ever valid, are becoming more dubious by the day.

The Air Force, if it is to exercise the sort of "space control" envisioned by the new Rumsfeld policy recommendations, is going to have to have routine access to space, perhaps with crew aboard. This will only be accomplished (at least economically) with fast-response reusable systems. It is pointless to move forward with SLI in its current form until its relationship with military space activities, currently non-existent, can be resolved.

But the more significant policy revisit is driven by recognition of the fact that the program was incoherent, and directed by space-agency agendas not necessarily congruent with low-cost access.

The original idea of SLI, started in the wake of the disastrous X-33 program, was that NASA would take the lead in developing technology for "next-generation" launch systems. This was code word for new reusable space transportation systems.

More importantly, hijacked by various factions at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, and the Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville, it was really a plan to build a replacement for the current Space Shuttle, to be developed and operated by NASA, and thus preserve the current empires and fiefdoms that make the present Space Shuttle so costly and inefficient, and ensuring a continued costly monopoly of manned space by the agency for decades to come.

This agenda is revealed by the wording in popular accounts of the program's purpose, in which the definite article is generally used to describe the desired outcome.

"The next-generation vehicle."

"The 'Shuttle II'"

"The Shuttle replacement."

Note the implicit assumption--there will be a replacement for the current Shuttle and it will be a replacement, not replacements (plural).

In the space community, the question is often asked, "What will the next Shuttle look like?" Popular articles about space similarly speculate on the nature of the "next Shuttle." The question is often asked "can we get a Shuttle to the Moon?" (The answer is no).

Clearly, "Shuttle" has become synonymous in the minds of many in the public with space vehicle.

In his great work, Analects, the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucious wrote that if he was ever asked for wisdom by the government, the first thing he would tell them was that, before he could provide such advice, a rectification of names would be required.

If names are not rectified, then language will not be in accord with truth.

If language is not in accord with truth, then things cannot be accomplished.

It would be well for the government in general, and NASA in particular, to heed this admonition.

As a humble beginning to such a rectification of names, I hereby propose that we purge the word "Shuttle" from our national space vocabulary. As applied to space vehicles, it is a word from a different era. It was an era still in the Cold War, when few could imagine a space program without NASA in charge, when few could imagine free enterprise offering rides into space. It became a symbol of a national space program, one size fits all--a vehicle that could build space stations, resupply space stations, and indeed (as a fallback position, in case the funding didn't come through for space stations in the future) be a space station itself.

Shuttle was dramatically overspecified. Its payload capacity was too large. Its ability to change direction on entry (called cross range), which made its wings much larger than otherwise needed, was dictated not by NASA's requirements, but by the Department of Defense, whose blessing was necessary for program approval. It wasn't just a truck, but a Winnebago, capable of acting as a space hotel and science lab as well as a delivery system. These, among other reasons, are why it is so expensive, and such a policy failure.

Yes, while Shuttle is a magnificent technical achievement, it truly is a catastrophic policy failure--a failure made almost tangible, in half-billion-dollar increments each time it flies, a few times a year.

And the failure is not in its design--it is in its requirements, its very philosophy, the very notion that a single system can be all things to all people, or even all things to all parts of our space agency. Anything that replaces the Shuttle, in terms of those requirements, will suffer from the same flaws and failures.

We don't need a replacement for the Shuttle.

We need a space transportation industry.

It should be like our air transportation industry, or our ground transportation industry, competitive and flexible, to meet the needs of individuals and large corporations, and it should be based on the principles of a market economy--not the wish list of government bureaucrats.

We don't have a "national airplane." We don't have a "national truck," or a "national bus." We have a variety of vehicles, tailored to a variety of markets at variety of prices for different customers and desires.

Three decades ago, with hope in our hearts, fresh from our lunar success, we initiated the first Space Shuttle program. If we wish a vibrant future in space, one in which thousands of people will venture off the planet in pursuit of their dreams, we should hope, even more, that it's also our last.

[Update on Friday night]

Frank Sietzen at the Space Transportation Association has responded to the column.

I've responded to his response.

Posted by Rand Simberg at October 23, 2002 10:00 PM
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Years ago, when I was in college, I read an article, I believe it may have been in an AIAA publication, regarding the then so-called "common upper stage", IUS being the case in point.

The authors basic contention was that in order to accommodate everyone it had to be able to have a very wide range of capabilities which tended to make it a very expensive vehicle which drove away many customers straightaway which made the vehicle more expensive to operate which drove the need to make it ultra-reliable to overcome the fear of failure with such a vehicle which made it even more expensive to operate further reducing the customer base until such time as there were no remaining customers and the vehicle went away.

The article concluded with the author postulating that the Shuttle would become the ultimate expression of the "common upper stage" concept.

This before the Enterprise did its 747 seperation and glide tests.

I am not trying to be critical of the program. I worked at KSC hands-on to launch the the first 10 shuttle flights and then worked cargo integration for the next 96 or so flights.

And all that time the conclusion the truth of the authors contention never left me.

I agree that the shuttle is a magnificant technical achievement and a wonderful hobby for those involved with it, in particular on the NASA side, but it is not nor has it ever been an operational or economically sound prospect.

Michael

Posted by Michael at October 24, 2002 07:02 AM

I read about this yesterday on space.com and I was like, Yay! I bet Rand will have something to say about this. Anyways the one thing that I am most unhappy about with the SLI proposal is the fact that all the conceptual drawings of a future SLI vehicle are retarded looking. Have you seen the LockMart proposal it just looks absolutely silly looking. I hope they just scrap the whole thing and come up with something that is at least halfway serious this time.

Posted by Hefty at October 24, 2002 09:17 AM

Hefty - the vehicle designs shown on NASA sites and PR are not always what the contractors are showing privately to NASA. One part of SLI research that is proprietary is the vehicle design concept. Believe me, what may be shown in private can be very different.

Also, there is a lot more going on under the SLI banner than just the vehicle designs. Tests of new thermal protection systems and materials, tests of new main engines, etc. There is a lot of R&D gruntwork going on under the SLI banner, but most of it doesn't look sexy on the news, so progress in those areas are not reported.

Posted by Archie at October 24, 2002 10:16 AM

Yes, and if NASA would just quietly do that technology work and make it available to industry, as NACA used to, it would be very useful activity, but instead Marshall wants to turn the program into Shuttle II.

Posted by Rand Simberg at October 24, 2002 10:27 AM


[ Hefty - the vehicle designs shown on NASA sites and PR are not always what the contractors are showing privately to NASA. One part of SLI research that is proprietary is the vehicle design concept. Believe me, what may be shown in private can be very different.]

Oh, so they're keeping the really good designs secret, huh? I am skeptical. It seems to me that the venders have dusted off the same old menagerie of designs that have been around for 30 years or so. Anyone for bimese or timese or tip tanks?

NASA and its contractors just can't seem to converge on a shuttle replacement macro design, for the institutional reasons that Mr. Simbergt has described.

Fellas, I wouldn't worry too much about NASA's fixation on "THE" replacement for the Shuttle because I don't think SLI will ever get past the paper design stage.


[Also, there is a lot more going on under the SLI banner than just the vehicle designs. Tests of new thermal protection systems and materials, tests of new main engines, etc.]


Shades of X-33 and X-34. Part of the X-33 fiasco is that LockMart gave people the impression that it was doing more work on the X-33 than people realized, in black projects or somewhere. In fact, Lockheed wasn't doing so. X-33 was shockingly under-engineered and overhyped. That was what was going on then. History may repeat itself under th SLI banner.

[ Tests of new thermal protection systems and materials ... ]

Yeah, sure just like X-34.


Posted by David Davenport at October 24, 2002 04:44 PM



Previous Comments
Years ago, when I was in college, I read an article, I believe it may have been in an AIAA publication, regarding the then so-called "common upper stage", IUS being the case in point.

The authors basic contention was that in order to accommodate everyone it had to be able to have a very wide range of capabilities which tended to make it a very expensive vehicle which drove away many customers straightaway which made the vehicle more expensive to operate which drove the need to make it ultra-reliable to overcome the fear of failure with such a vehicle which made it even more expensive to operate further reducing the customer base until such time as there were no remaining customers and the vehicle went away.

The article concluded with the author postulating that the Shuttle would become the ultimate expression of the "common upper stage" concept.

This before the Enterprise did its 747 seperation and glide tests.

I am not trying to be critical of the program. I worked at KSC hands-on to launch the the first 10 shuttle flights and then worked cargo integration for the next 96 or so flights.

And all that time the conclusion the truth of the authors contention never left me.

I agree that the shuttle is a magnificant technical achievement and a wonderful hobby for those involved with it, in particular on the NASA side, but it is not nor has it ever been an operational or economically sound prospect.

Michael


Posted by Michael at October 24, 2002 07:02 AM


I read about this yesterday on space.com and I was like, Yay! I bet Rand will have something to say about this. Anyways the one thing that I am most unhappy about with the SLI proposal is the fact that all the conceptual drawings of a future SLI vehicle are retarded looking. Have you seen the LockMart proposal it just looks absolutely silly looking. I hope they just scrap the whole thing and come up with something that is at least halfway serious this time.

Posted by Hefty at October 24, 2002 09:17 AM


Hefty - the vehicle designs shown on NASA sites and PR are not always what the contractors are showing privately to NASA. One part of SLI research that is proprietary is the vehicle design concept. Believe me, what may be shown in private can be very different.

Also, there is a lot more going on under the SLI banner than just the vehicle designs. Tests of new thermal protection systems and materials, tests of new main engines, etc. There is a lot of R&D gruntwork going on under the SLI banner, but most of it doesn't look sexy on the news, so progress in those areas are not reported.

Posted by Archie at October 24, 2002 10:16 AM


Yes, and if NASA would just quietly do that technology work and make it available to industry, as NACA used to, it would be very useful activity, but instead Marshall wants to turn the program into Shuttle II.

Posted by Rand Simberg at October 24, 2002 10:27 AM

Posted by David Davenport at October 24, 2002 04:50 PM

My prediction is, NASA is going to "re-discover" Shuttle-C and liquid fuel flyback boosters as the NLI solution.

Posted by David Davenport at October 24, 2002 05:05 PM

I think that pursuing a beaurocratic approach to launch vehicle development is fundamentally flawed, particularly at the present time, when many alternative designs exist.

I'd rather see the government put out a quote for "payload x to orbit y, z dollars a kilo" and say "You build the rocket, we'll buy 10 launches in 5 years." Launch providers eat their development costs and a test flight (two?), as well as any cost overruns.

This benefits lots of companies who might otherwise not be able to secure financing, and would hopefully lead to exploration of a number of different approaches.

At the end of it, it should be less expensive than having NASA develop a single system their way, and you get a number of working systems, a great deal of new data, and possibly the beginnings of a competitive civilian launch industry.

Jon Acheson

Posted by at October 25, 2002 10:58 AM

[ I'd rather see the government put out a quote for "payload x to orbit y, z dollars a kilo" and say "You build the rocket, we'll buy 10 launches in 5 years." Launch providers eat their development costs and a test flight (two?), as well as any cost overruns.]

Jon,

I'm afraid NASA wouldn't be able to get any launch providers to eat their own development costs.

NASA and DoD contractors aren't used to providing their own capital for big projcts. The custom is for the gu'ment to finance aerospace projects on a payments-made-as-progress milestones-reached plan. In other words, the government puts up most of the capital for big projects.

I certainly agree with you, Jon, that it would be nice to change this customary practice. But I'm pessimistic about such a change actually happening.

You say this practice is the fault of Big Government-ism? I say it's also the fault of cautious capitalists unwilling to risk their money on space ventures.

I think that government-financed aerospace contractors should at least pay a bigger penalty for project failure. Whereas, Lockheed paid no penalty at all for the X-33 debacle. Instead, LockMart has since gotten new SLI contracts.

-- david.davenport@mindspring.com

Posted by David Davenport at October 25, 2002 02:41 PM

I don't think that's a problem. The conventional industry won't bid, but they'll get bids from new companies that form to go after the money. The tough part will be providing a strong enough guarantee that the government won't welsh on the deal.

Posted by Rand Simberg at October 25, 2002 02:46 PM

Oh, a postscript.

P.S.:

[ I'd rather see the government put out a quote for "payload x to orbit y, z dollars a kilo" and say "You build the rocket, we'll buy 10 launches in 5 years." ... ]

But surely you're not asking for the government to pay for x launches in y years unless the launch device works? Essentially, you're asking for the gu'ment to pay a fixed price for a successfully finished product, aren't you? That's a great idea, if you can find a private firm that will sign such a contract.

[ This benefits lots of companies who might otherwise not be able to secure financing, and would hopefully lead to exploration of a number of different approaches.]

Sorry, but in the absence of payments for progress milestones reached before the project is completed, I doubt that companies would find it easy to secure financing for big ticket aerospace machines.

...

Look, my larger point is that big time space launchers are a sector where market failure has occurred. Private enterprise is thus far unwilling to put up its own money for manned space vehicles. The stagnant NASA bureaucracy occupies the manned space launch sector by default.

-- David Davenport

Posted by David Davenport at October 25, 2002 02:51 PM

Looks like someone from NASA's PR has responded to your article. Man they're clueless.

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=9640

Posted by Brett Brewer at October 25, 2002 02:52 PM

OK, a little bit more:

I would very much would like to see NASA diversify away from its excessively cozy relationship with Boeing and Lockheed and a few other current name-brand contractors.

However, I am pessimistic about purely private enterprise, Libertarian solutions to America's space launch needs. If space is so delicious and nutritious and wunnerful, why isn't some firm somewhere in the world already building space launch vehicles without any government financing?


Sorry guys, sorry Rand.

-- David D.

Posted by David Davenport at October 25, 2002 03:03 PM

That's not NASA PR. Frank Sietzen is the head of the Space Transportation Association.

Posted by Rand Simberg at October 25, 2002 03:29 PM

If space is so delicious and nutritious and wunnerful, why isn't some firm somewhere in the world already building space launch vehicles without any government financing?

Actually, they are--they're just not getting enough money yet. As to why it's not happening faster, or hasn't happened yet, I could write a book about that.

Oh, wait. I am. ;-)

Posted by at October 25, 2002 03:30 PM

Money must be justified and replacing an aging existing system is about as simple minded a justification as can be had.

I would think that a multitude of different systems (with some common elements perhaps) could be more efficient for different types of payloads?

For cargo, what's the big deal with most of the rocket being expendable as long as it's cheap?

Since the astronauts are the only ones that have to come back, perhaps only a small vehicle with no cargo makes more sense for a reusable vehicle?

Am I being stupid or what?

Posted by ken anthony at October 25, 2002 07:08 PM

...why not semi retire the existing shuttles then (keeping them in the bullpen only to be used for the purpose of retrieving things when we must?)

Posted by ken anthony at October 25, 2002 07:11 PM

...semi retirement of the existing shuttle fleet might also allow existing contractors to be weaned off rather than all or nothing.

Posted by ken anthony at October 25, 2002 07:16 PM

Ken, the Shuttle fleet has been in semi-retirement since the Challenger disaster. It currently flies about four times a year. That's one flight per vehicle, annually.

How much less activity would constitute "semi-retirement" to you?

If you're saying just fly them once in a while, when you need them, understand that there would be little savings from that. Most of the costs of the Shuttle program are fixed costs, and are not reduced by not flying. You can fly the current Shuttles at the current flight rate at about three billion per year, or have the work force sitting around twiddling thumbs (and hoping that they don't forget their jobs) waiting for someone to decide (a few months before they actually have to go) to do a flight, and spend about two and a half billion.

What you propose makes no sense at all.

As I've said repeatedly, the source of high launch costs is low flight rates. Lowering the Shuttle's flight rate below what it is now would just exacerbate the problem, and endanger the crew and the vehicles, by not keeping the standing army on top of the learning curve.

Posted by Rand Simberg at October 25, 2002 08:52 PM

Hefty - I can assure you that there are SLI vehicle concepts being worked that look nothing like the pretty pictures on the NASA press releases and web sites. That area of research is the only one that is proprietary, since it is the area that could lead to a vehicle development contract.

Rand - Except for TA-1, my understanding is that all of the other research is not proprietary and much should be available from NASA as interim reports and final reports.

David - >>Whereas, Lockheed paid no penalty at all for the X-33 debacle.
Actually, Lockheed did. They put $357 million of their own money into it, and have had to write it off.

Posted by Archie at October 25, 2002 09:12 PM

"Write it off"? I don't think you can write off IR&D, since it's reimbursable. Are you saying they actually put their own money (i.e., it came off the profit bottom line) into it? I'll believe it when I see the books.

And even if they did, it was still a bargain, considering that it kept their cash cows, Titan, Atlas and half of Shuttle in good health for several more years.

Posted by Rand Simberg at October 25, 2002 10:03 PM

However, I am pessimistic about purely private enterprise, Libertarian solutions to America's space launch needs. If space is so delicious and nutritious and wunnerful, why isn't some firm somewhere in the world already building space launch vehicles without any government financing?

First, a number of firms are building space launch vehicles, but they are hindered by the currently established system.

One problem they have is that the big established firms ARE getting government financing, and it is difficult to compete with someone being financed by the entity you intend to sell to. Beal Aerospace claims that this was why they exited the market, for example.

In the launch regimes outside of NASA's SLI purview, such as relatively small payloads, commercial companies are already established and doing well so far.

Lastly, Libertarian? I never even read Ayn Rand...

Jon Acheson

Posted by Jon Acheson at October 28, 2002 07:14 AM

Re: Semi-retirement. Poor choice of words, I was thinking standby (with the assumption there might be missions only the shuttle could perform, although I don't believe that.)

I agree with your point about fixed costs (my disgust has brought me to the point of being blind to the issue.) NASA tear down those walls!

I was just thinking that a variety of vehicles designed for specific environments would be cheaper than everything under the sun designs which both the shuttle and station appear to be.

What are the environments?

Cargo to orbit (big dumb booster?)

People to orbit (which is cheaper, using soyuz or designing and building essentially the same thing?)

Orbital tugs (unmanned when not being used, never leaving orbit, not designed for reentry.)

Reentry device (not vehicle) because gravity, parachutes and a heat shield would do the trick... Stored in a suitcase and so cheap that dozens are kept in anything a person might visit in orbit.

Space stations requiring a single launch; redundant cheap systems with a standard docking collar in case we decide to play legos with those tugs.

Hey, didn't we do all these things in the sixties using vacuum tubes?

Posted by Ken Anthony at October 31, 2002 07:32 PM


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